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Abstract
At least since Arrow (1962), economists have believed that strong property rights are
necessary for firms to invest in innovation. This belief was a key principle underlying
the Bayh-Dole Act, which gave universities the right to own and license federally
funded inventions, because the commercialization of university inventions requires
private firm investment in development, given the early stage of these inventions at
the time that they are licensed. However, surprisingly little research has examined
this key principle. In this paper, we exploit a database of 805 attempts by private
firms to commercialize inventions licensed exclusively from MIT between 1980 and
1996 to address this issue. The data allow us to examine the timing of subsequent
commercialization or termination of the licenses to these inventions as a function of
the length of patent protection, as well as other measures of appropriability. We
model the firm’s investment decision as an optimal stopping problem, and we char-
acterize the hazard rates of first sale and termination over time. In both the theory
and the empirical analysis, we find two opposing effects of time. The length of patent
protection provides an incentive for the firm to invest that declines with time; while
the probability of technical success increases in each period that the firm invests.
Competing risks models to predict the resulting hazards of first sale and termina-
tion reveal that, for these data, the hazard of first sale has an inverted u-shape and
the hazard of termination has a u-shape. We find that increased appropriability, as
measured by Lerner’s index of patent scope and effectiveness of patents in a line of
business, decrease the hazard of termination and increase the hazard of first sale.
1 Introduction
University patent licensing has grown steadily in the two decades since the Bayh-Dole
Act gave universities the right to own and license the results of federally funded re-
search.3 While many researchers and policy makers cite the passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act as instrumental in facilitating the commercialization of university inventions,
others question whether the Act has mattered at all. As a result, the debate over
the value of giving universities the property rights to federally-funded inventions has
continued since the initial discussion of the Act in the late 1970s and shows no sign of
abating. In fact, within the last year, Congress, the National Academies’ Committee
on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, and the President’s Commission on
Science and Technology have all undertaken review of Bayh-Dole.
Beneath the rhetoric, there has been surprisingly little analysis of the key princi-
ple underlying the debate: would private firms adopt and commercialize university
inventions in the absence of strong property rights to the inventions results? Some
observers say the answer is yes. As noted by Nelson (2001), two of the most im-
portant university patents (Cohen-Boyer at Stanford and Axel at Columbia) were
adopted by companies without exclusive licenses. In their case-study analysis, Coly-
vas et al. (2002) find that inventions “ready for use” (four of their ten cases) were
successfully licensed and put to commercial use without exclusive license. There is
also extensive evidence of university research that has been transferred to industry
by other means than technology licensing, including publications, consulting, and
conference participation (See, for example, Adams, 1990; Agrawal and Henderson,
2002; Cohen et al., 1998; Jaffe, 1989; Mansfield, 1995; and Zucker et al., 1998).
Nonetheless, the proponents of Bayh-Dole argue that because the commercial
success of university inventions is highly uncertain and typically requires substan-
tial development, private firms will not make the necessary investment unless they
can appropriate the returns to that investment. It has long been recognized that
3According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), the number of
universities with technology transfer offices grew from 20 in 1980 to over 200 in 1990. For the 95
US institutions responding to the AUTM survey in both 1991 and 1999, the number of inventions
disclosed by faculty increased 65% to a total of 8457 in 1997, the number of new patent applications
filed increased 175% to 4032, the number of license and option agreements executed increased 135%
to 2734, and royalties increased more than 250% (in real terms) to around $665 million.
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uncertainty and inappropriability can lead to underinvestment in research and de-
velopment (the classic reference being Arrow, 1962). University inventions are un-
certain and require subsequent development to achieve commercial success. A recent
survey of businesses who license from universities indicates that almost half of uni-
versity inventions fail (Thursby and Thursby, 2003). Moreover, a survey of sixty-two
U.S. university technology transfer offices provides evidence that eighty-eight percent
of the inventions licensed require further development, and seventy-five percent are
so embryonic that commercial success requires faculty participation in the process
(Thursby et al., 2001). Jensen and Thursby (2001) construct a model of exclusive
licensing and show that the necessary faculty participation would not be forthcoming
without license payments tied to firm performance, such as royalties or equity. The
focus of this work, however, is the role of contracts in obtaining faculty cooperation
rather than the role of appropriability.
In this paper, we exploit a unique database that allows us to address directly the
issue of whether private firms would adopt and commercialize university inventions
in the absence of strong property rights to the technology. We examine the popula-
tion of 805 attempts by private sector firms to commercialize inventions assigned to
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and licensed exclusively by the institution
between 1980 and 1996. We use information obtained from the MIT technology li-
censing office on the dates of patent award and license execution, as well as the timing
of subsequent commercialization of those inventions or termination of the licenses.
We examine the relationship between the length of patent protection remaining on
the inventions as well as other measures of appropriability and commercialization
efforts. We argue that the length of patent protection remaining on an invention
provides an incentive for private firms to commercialize university inventions. How-
ever, given the early stage of most university technologies, their commercialization
takes time, initially increasing the probability of commercialization and decreasing
the probability of termination because the probability that development will yield a
commercially viable product increases over time. We also argue that other measures
of appropriability, such as patent effectiveness and patent scope, increase the hazard
of first sale and decrease the hazard of termination.
In Sections 2 and 3, we present a model of exclusive licensing in which a single
firm that has licensed a university invention decides in each period whether to invest
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in further development, thereby increasing the probability of (technical) success, or
to terminate the project. If the firm is successful at commercialization, it earns
monopoly profit until the patent expires. If successful, the firm sells its new product
immediately. Because of the opposing effects of length of remaining patent protection
and effect of time on the probability of technical success, we find that patent age may
have non-monotonic effects on both the hazard of termination and the hazard of first
sale. The model predicts that for inventions with a sufficiently low initial probability
of technical success, the hazard of termination has a u-shape and the hazard of
first sale has an inverted u-shape, a pattern that we find in our data. The model
also supports the view that wider patent scope and more effective patents decrease
(increase) the hazard of termination (commercialization) regardless of patent age.
In sections 4 and 5, we present the data and empirical results for competing risks
regression models to predict the hazard of first sale and license termination for 805
attempts to commercialize MIT-assigned patents licensed exclusively between 1980
and 1996. We find strong support for a u-shaped relationship with the age of the
patent and the hazard of termination and somewhat weaker support for an inverted u-
shaped relationship between the hazard of first sale and patent age. We also find that
several other measures of appropriability, most notably the effectiveness of patents
in a line of business and Lerner’s index of patent scope, increase the hazard of first
sale and decrease the hazard of termination. Our results are robust to controlling for
the general technical field in which the invention is found, and the source of funding
for the invention.
These results contribute, not only to the growing literature on innovation based
on university research, but also to the broader literature on the relation between
patents and innovation. As emphasized in a recent survey by Gallini (2002), the link
between patent strength and innovation is, in general, ambiguous. Models which
examine the relation between R&D spending and patent length in the presence of
uncertainty find they are positively related (see Kamien and Schwartz, 1974 and
Goel, 1996). However, Horowitz and Lai (1996) find an inverse u-shape relationship
between patent length and the rate of innovation, and Lerner (2002) finds empirical
support for such a relationship. In this work, the negative effect of patent length on
innovation comes from taking into account the cumulative process of innovation and
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strategic effects from subsequent research.4 Our results differ in that we explicitly
incorporate the uncertainty associated with development of university inventions and
we abstract from strategic issues.
Finally, we contribute to the empirical literature on the effectiveness of patents
in appropriating returns from R&D. Much of this work focuses on the effectiveness
of patents relative to other mechanisms and differences in appropriability across
industries and countries (see, for example, Levin et al., 1987, Cohen et al., 1998,
and Cohen et al., 2000, Lanjoux and Cockburn, 2000). While a few studies examine
whether products or processes would not have been developed in the absence of
patents (Taylor and Silberston, 1973, Mansfield, 1986, and Mansfield et al., 1981),
their evidence is based on perceptions of R&D personnel responding to surveys. To
our knowledge, ours is the only study to directly examine the relationship between
patent characteristics and commercialization or termination of projects.
2 The Model
In this section, we consider the problem faced by a firm that has licensed a uni-
versity invention which requires further development before it can be successfully
commercialized. We assume that the firm has an exclusive license agreement with
the university so that if development is successful, it will earn monopoly profits per
period until the patent expires, which occurs at L ≥ 2.5 The age of the patent at
the time of license is given by a, a ∈ {0, . . . , L}, and licensing periods are indexed
by t, where t ∈ {0, . . . , L− a}, so that a + t represents patent age in period t of the
license.
To successfully commercialize the invention, the firm must invest c per period.
This running development cost includes not only internal costs but also payments
to the university, such as milestones, minimum royalties, and sponsored research.
The returns to this investment are uncertain for both technical and market reasons.
In a recent survey of businesses that license-in university inventions, Thursby and
Thursby (2003) found that 46% of all inventions licensed fail and of these 47% failed
4Kamien and Schwartz (1974) find a negative relation between rivalry and the magnitude of
innovation.
5As a matter of fact, L = 17.
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for purely technical reasons. This is not surprising since roughly half of university in-
ventions licensed are no more than a proof of concept at the time of license (Thursby
et al., 2001). Moreover, defining market opportunities for early stage inventions is
highly uncertain, so much so that many university inventions end up with applica-
tions that were not even anticipated at the time of license (Shane, 2000, and Thursby
and Thursby, 2002).
We denote the probability the firm’s development effort is successful by pt ∈ [0, 1)
∀t.6 This function represents the technical probability of success. While investment
may not increase the probability of success in any period, it is natural to assume
that pt is non-decreasing. The firm would not invest unless this were the case.
7 We
further assume, as we believe is intuitive, that for any sequence of probabilities of
success {pn}Ln=0, the probability of of success grows at a finite rate, that is, pn+1pn is
finite for every n.8
Suppose the firm is successful in period t, then expected cumulative discounted
profit is given by Π̃a+t(δ) where δ is the discount factor (δ = (1 + r)
−1 and r > 0
is the interest rate). Thus, from the firm’s perspective, in any period before t,
Π̃a+t(δ) is a random variable with cumulative distribution function Fa+t on the in-
terval [0, Π]. We assume that the set of possible profit realizations is identical for
all patent ages, but high realizations are more likely the younger the patent.9 For-
mally, Fn(B) ≤ Fn+1(B),∀n. The distribution of profit outcomes when the patent
is n years old first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of profit outcomes
when the patent is n + 1 years old. This reflects two aspects of the patent aging:
first, the number of periods the firm can earn monopoly profit declines, and second,
the probability that a competing firm will commercialize a non-infringing substitute
6This is an important difference between our model and that of Horowitz and Lai (1996) who
consider innovations that are a sure success.
7Thus we assume pt is the true probability of success. An alternative, and more complicated
model, would allow the firm’s perceived probability of success to differ from the true probability. In
that case, investment could yield positive or negative observations which would be used to update
the firm’s perceived (prior) probability according to Bayes Rule.
8This rules out the probability of success jumping from an amount arbitrarily close zero to a
non-zero amount. We assume that is pt is close to zero, then so is pt+1.
9It is not excluded that some of the outcomes in the interval will occur with zero-probability for
some patent ages. We are thinking particularly about low (high) outcomes for low (high) patent
ages.
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increases (thereby reducing monopoly profit). Define µn ≡ En[Π̃n], where En is the
expectation operator. The subscript n indicates that the expected value is computed
using Fn. We denote the sequence of expected profits, {µn}n=Ln=0 , by P . Given our
assumption on the distribution function, µn is non-increasing in patent age.
If the firm is successful, it sells immediately. There are several reasons for this
assumption. One is that it greatly simplifies the problem. In the Appendix we show
how the firm’s problem changes if it can delay selling. Second, and more importantly,
the overwhelming majority of university licenses (and almost all of the MIT licenses)
include minimum royalties or milestone payments designed to prevent licensees from
delaying commercialization (Thursby et al., 2001). These payments, which we denote
by m ≤ c, reflect university attempts to ensure that the federal government does not
“march-in” and exercise its right to find alternative licensees if it deems that the
licensing firm “has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time,
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention.”10 In the
context of our model, the assumption that Fn(B) = 0 for every B ≤ δµn+1 − m
guarantees that the firm has no incentive to delay commercialization.
The firm’s problem, then, is an optimal stopping problem similar to that analyzed
by Roberts and Weitzman (1981).11 Simply put, the firm’s optimal decision rule is
to continue in any period with a positive continuation value and stop as soon as
the continuation value becomes zero. Using dynamic programming, the value of
continuing at any t if the firm started to license when the patent was a years old can
10See Section 203 of the Bayh Dole Act. If the terms of the contract perfectly enforce “commer-
cialization” one would expect march-in rights not to be exercised, and in fact they have not. In the
public policy debates over Bayh Dole revision, Rai and Eisenberg (2002), argue that the march-in
provisions should be strengthened.
11Our model is similar to their sequential decision process (SDP), although in their model, the
SDP must go through a deterministic number of stages before completion. In our model, in every
period, there is a positive probability that the current period is the period of completion. In this
sense, our model bears many similarities to Grossman and Shapiro (1986), but their focus is on
optimal development expenditure, rather than optimal stopping. They assume the value of investing
is positive throughout so that termination is not an issue. Kamien and Schwartz (1971) examine
similar problems under various assumptions about the probability of success. Optimal stopping
problems have also been examined in the context of search (see Lippman and McCall (1976)) and
diffusion of innovation (see Jensen, 1981; 2003).
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be written as:
Vc(t, Πa+t; a) = max{ptΠa+t + (1− pt)δEVc(t + 1, Π̃a+t+1; a)− c, 0}, (1)
where Πa+t is the realized value of profit in period t. The expectation is taken over
Π̃a+t+1 and a is treated as a parameter. The terminal condition that ensures that
the dynamic programming problem is well-defined is ΠL+1 ≡ 0. When the patent
expires, cumulative profits fall to zero with probability one. Given that success did
not occur in t − 1, (1) says that the value of continuing is equal to the maximum
of 0, in which case the firm terminates the license, and profit if success occurs plus
the value of continuing in the next period if development is unsuccessful, minus the
development cost paid in the current period. We assume that EVc(0, Π̃0; 0) > 0 to
ensure that the invention has a positive discounted expected value overall.
The optimal termination rule is simple: “Continue to invest as long as Vc > 0.
As soon as Vc drops to zero, terminate the license.” Therefore the probability of
termination conditional on neither termination, nor first sale, occurring before t is
given by pf (t; a) = Pr(Vc(t, Πa+t; a) ≤ 0) = Fa+t(B(t; a)), where:
B(t; a) =
c− (1− pt)δEVc(t + 1, Π̃a+t+1; a)
pt
. (2)
B(t; a) measures the net expected cost of continuing at period t, that is the devel-
opment cost net of the discounted expected value of continuing in the next period,
discounted by the probability of success in the current period.12
From Vc(L+1−a; a) ≡ 0, it follows that the firm terminates with probability one
at L + 1. Using this fact, the optimal stopping rule and first sale decision generate
a well-defined probability distribution over termination dates in {0, . . . , L + 1− a}:
Pf (t; a) = pf (t; a)
t−1∏
k=0
(1− pk)(1− pf (k; a)). (3)
Similarly, the optimal first sale decision generates a well-defined probability distri-
bution over dates of first sale in {0, . . . , L + 1− a}:13
Ps(t; a) = ps(t; a)
t−1∏
k=0
(1− pk)(1− pf (k; a)). (4)
12We suppress Π̃a+t1 as an argument from B(t; a) and the hazard functions defined below for
notational convenience.
13Pi(t; a) ≤ 1 for very t and
∑L−a+1
t=0 Pi(t; a) = 1, i = f, s.
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The joint survival function in period t is the probability that the firm has neither
terminated, nor commercialized in any period k ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}. In the context of




(1− pk)(1− pf (k; a)) =
t−1∏
k=0
(1− pk)(1− Fa+t(B(k; a))).
The hazard of termination in period t is the probability that the firm terminates
in period t given that it neither terminated, nor commercialized before t and is given
by:
hf (t; a) ≡ Pf (t; a)
s(t; a)
= pf (t; a) = Fa+t(B(t; a)). (5)
Similarly, the hazard of first sale t is given by:
hs(t; a) ≡ Ps(t; a)
s(t; a)
= ps(t; a) = (1− pf (t; a))pt. (6)
(6) represents the probability that the firm commercializes in period t conditional
on the firm not having commercialized or terminated before t. It is straightforward
to see that both hazard rates may decrease or increase as a patent ages. Ceteris
paribus, an increase in a increases both the hazard of termination and the hazard of
first sale because it increases the net expected cost of continuing given by (2). The
question of interest, however, is how the hazard rates change over time given a.
3 Comparative statics
Comparative statics allow us to examine the effect of patent age, expected profit, and
the probability of technical success on the firm’s decisions. Not surprisingly, param-
eters that increase expected cumulative profits (such as patent scope and strength)
decrease the hazard of termination regardless of patent age. Conversely, parameters
that decrease expected profits (such as financial constraints) increase the hazard of
termination regardless of patent age. The relation between patent age and termina-
tion is, as expected, more complex. The fact that an older patent provides exclusive
legal rights for fewer periods provides an incentive for the firm to terminate sooner
than if it held a more recent patent. However, the firm is more likely to be successful
at development the longer it has invested, so that the effect of patent age (a + t) on
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the hazard of termination may be non-monotonic. Finally, we show that the hazards
of termination and first sale can be inversely related.
3.1 Termination decision
Consider, first, the effect of a more favorable distribution of profit outcomes on the
hazard of termination. Proposition 1 below says that for two distributions of profit
outcomes associated with an invention, the hazard of termination is lower in every
period for the distribution with better outcomes than for the other distribution.
Proposition 1 Given a and δ, if {F ′n}Ln=0 and {Fn}Ln=0 are such that for every n,
F ′n(B) ≤ Fn(B), ∀X, the hazard of termination is lower if the sequence of profit
distributions is given by {F ′n}Ln=0 than if it is given by {Fn}Ln=0.
Thus anything that improves the distribution of profits, such as wider patent scope or
greater strength, will provide higher continuation values on average in every period
of development and, therefore, a later termination date with lower probability of
occurrence.
Ceteris paribus, factors that increase the firm’s ability to appropriate returns from
investment in the invention will have a positive effect on continuation independent of
patent age. It is important to note, however, that patent characteristics associated
with expected profits may have ambiguous effects on continuation. For example,
inventions with fewer citations to prior art are more novel and may command higher
monopoly profit, but their development is more uncertain. Assuming that less prior
art increases the sequence of expected profit, P , and decreases the probability of
success in the first licensing period (p0), the effect on the hazard of termination is
ambiguous.
The same observation can be made regarding comparative statics on invention
characteristics, such as whether the invention radically improves upon existing prod-
ucts or processes. Radical inventions are typically more difficult to develop, but
yield higher monopoly profit if successful. In the model, more difficult development
can be represented by a higher c, holding the sequence {pn}n=Ln=0 constant, which
would increase the hazard of termination. On the other hand, higher profitability
may counterbalance or overturn the effect of higher development costs. Therefore,
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it is not clear whether higher radicality should increase or decrease the hazard of
termination.
In Proposition 2, we consider the effect of the discount factor δ. The traditional
interpretation for δ is that it measures the interest forgone by investing in the project
for one more period. Alternatively, we can view δ as a measure of the interest rate
paid by the firm on loans associated with the investment, with a lower δ representing
a higher interest rate. Proposition 2 follows from taking the view that δ represents
the importance of financial constraints faced by the firm:
Proposition 2 Given a, firms that face looser financial constraints have lower haz-
ards of termination.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we consider the effect of patent age on the firm’s decision to terminate
the license in a particular period. Holding t constant, simple comparative statics
show that ∂B(t;a)
∂a
≥ 0. Therefore, in any given period, a license executed for an older
patent will have a higher probability of termination and thus, a higher hazard of
termination. However, time may have a positive effect on the continuation value
through increased development effort, or a higher probability of success.
Proposition 3 Given the parameters of the model, if the distribution of profit out-
comes changes slowly with patent age and the probability of technical success is low
and increases slowly initially, then the hazard of termination decreases with patent
age if the patent is young. Otherwise, the hazard of termination increases with patent
age.
Proof. See Appendix.
Patent age has an ambiguous effect on the hazard of termination because of the
two opposing dimensions of time. As time passes, the chances that the firm’s invest-
ment will yield a highly profitable product decrease (Fa+t) as the periods remaining
on the patent decrease (and therefore the length of time it can earn monopoly profit),
but the probability that the invention will lead to a product increases (pt). In order
for the hazard of termination to decrease over time, it must be the case that the
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positive effect of the increasing probability of technical success over time outweighs
the negative effect of the distribution of profit outcomes over time. This suggests
that if the hazard of termination ever decreases with patent age, then it must be for
low patent ages, when the firm still expects relatively high cumulative profits, and
the invention is at an early stage of development.
3.2 Commercialization decision
Recall from Section 2 that termination and the date of first sale are closely related.
More precisely, the hazard of first sale increases if the hazard of termination decreases.
Therefore, an increase in expected profit throughout the life of the patent decreases
the hazard of termination, and thus increases the hazard of first sale, for every patent
age.
Proposition 4 Given a and δ, if {F ′n}Ln=0 and {Fn}Ln=0 are such that for every
n, F ′n(B) ≤ Fn(B),∀X, the hazard of first sale is higher if the sequence of profit
distributions is given by {F ′n}Ln=0 than if it is given by {Fn}Ln=0.
To the extent that wider patent scope or strength increase expected profits, it follows
that they increase the hazard of first sale for every patent age.
The hazard of first sale therefore increases whenever the probability of first sale
increases. It decreases, however, only if the probability of first sale decreases enough.
In a given development period, older patents represented by a higher a have a lower
hazard of first sale simply because the probability that the license has not been
terminated before reaching this development period is lower. The effect of develop-
ment for a given age at the time of the license is ambiguous. We have the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 Given the parameters of the model, if the hazard of termination
decreases with patent age, then the hazard of first sale increases with patent age. If
the hazard of termination increases with patent age, the hazard of first sale could still
increase if the probability of technical success increases sufficiently fast.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Note that even if the hazard of termination increases with patent age, this is not
sufficient for the hazard of first sale to decrease for all patent ages.
In summary, the model implies a strong relationship between the hazards of
termination and first sale because of the timing of decisions. We find that better
appropriability in the sense of wider patent scope or more effective patents increases
both the hazard of termination and the hazard of first sale. On the other hand,
better appropriabiltity as measured by the age of the patent can have non-monotonic
effects on both hazard functions. This ambiguity comes from the opposing effects of
continued investment on the technical probability of success (a positive effect) and
the decrease in the number of periods left on the patent (a negative effect). The shape
of the hazard functions over time is therefore an empirical issue. Recall, however,
that our assumptions on the probability of technical success are based on empirical
evidence on the embryonic nature and high failure rate of university inventions. If we
were to assume that the probability of success is initially close to zero, but increasing
over time at a decreasing rate (i.e., diminishing returns to development), then one
would expect the hazard of termination to decrease initially but eventually flatten
out and perhaps increase.
4 Data
The data used to test the model’s predictions were collected from the Technology
Licensing Office (TLO) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on patents
assigned to the Institute between 1980 and 1996 and subsequently licensed exclusively
to private sector firms. The data include all patented inventions by MIT faculty, staff
and students from 1980 through 1996 that were assigned to the Institute and licensed
exclusively to at least one private firm.
Our data is an unbalanced, right censored panel. We have yearly data for each
attempt from the date of the contractual agreement on the patent until one of the
three events occurs: it is right censored (in 1996), it is terminated or it is commercial-
ized. An observation begins the year that MIT TLO records indicate that a firm first
licensed a patent. We code TERMINATION as zero, except in the year (if any) that
MIT TLO records indicate that the licensing agreement by the given firm no longer
covered the invention or if the patent expired, thereby negating the license. We code
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FIRSTSALE as zero, except in the year (if any) that the MIT TLO records indicate
that the first dollar of sales from a product or service embodying the invention was
achieved.
Since our theoretical model provides hypotheses regarding the behavior of firms
with exclusive licenses, we condition the empirical analysis on the TLO having li-
censed the invention exclusively. There are 805 exclusive attempts corresponding to
2845 periods in which licenses were at hazard.14 While it is plausible that licenses
are terminated after commercialization, the MIT licensing office reports that this is
a rare event, and hence this information was not collected. That is, we only observe
the first event that occurs. The analysis below predicts the likelihood of the first
event.15
Table 1 reports the unconditional survival rates and the extent of right censoring
for the sample of patents licensed exclusively. First and foremost, firms are far more
likely to terminate licenses of patents than successfully commercialize them (288
terminations vs. 168 successes). The table also suggests that uncertainty associated
with an innovation is generally resolved in the first 5 years of license. Note that
from the 6th year on, the conditional probabilities are based upon small samples.
85% of licenses either lead to commercialization or are terminated by the end of
period 5 and 90% of the observed events occur in the first five periods. We observe
only 2 events after period 10. Figure 1 shows the reduced-form event hazards of
termination and commercialization. The sparseness of this right tail implies that
there is little information on which to estimate the baseline hazard. Therefore, we
recoded all observations that survived more than five periods as right censored after
five periods. Thus, in addition to the observations that are right-censored after 1996,
we censored an additional 74 observations.
This does not mean that uncertainty is resolved within five years of issuance of
a patent. As is evident in table 2, it is not uncommon for patents of medium age
to be licensed, although this is very uncommon for old patents. It is not uncommon
for licenses to survive well into patent life before first sale or termination (table 3).
14Although we leave their analysis for future work, there are only 163 non-exclusive licenses in
the full sample. Very few patents are licensed exclusively in all fields of use and almost nothing is
licensed non-exclusively. It is straightforward to define a field of use and the scope of a field is very
flexible, so both sides are generally able to agree on a field of use in negotiation.
15Coding of commercialization was straightforward, as this is directly reported in the MIT data.
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85% of licenses are resolved before patents reach age 11.
The variation in patent age at the time of license allows us to distinguish between
the effects of the age of the license and the age of the patent on the hazards of first sale
and termination. The former are measured in the baseline hazard estimates, while
the latter are measured in the coefficients on age. This distinction is important
because the age of the license captures the effects of firm learning. If the effects
of patent age on first sale and termination are as predicted, this means that the
effects exist even after the effects of firm learning about the commercialization of the
technology have been controlled for.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for our analysis. We include several variables
in our regressions. We measure AGE OF PATENT as the number of years since the
patent was issued.
We employ several complementary measures to control for the quality of the
patent. First, we use Lerner’s (1994) measure of PATENT SCOPE, which is based
upon the number of international patent classifications found on the patent. Lerner
(1994) finds that this measure is associated with various measures of economic im-
portance: firm valuation, likelihood of patent litigation, and citations. He argues
that it represents broader scope of the monopoly rights covered by the patents. As
implied by Propositions 1 and 4 respectively, PATENT SCOPE should be negatively
related to the hazard of termination and positively related to the hazard of first sale.
Second, PRIOR ART CITED measures the number of prior patents cited by the
focal patent. Out theory is ambiguous as to the expected signs of the coefficients
on this variable. A decrease in prior art is associated with more novel and hence
more risky knowledge, which should increase the hazard of termination. However, a
decrease in prior art expands the scope of the property rights covered by the focal
patent, which should decrease the hazard of termination, ceteris paribus.
Third, we employ 4 measures from the Yale survey on innovation (Levin et al.,
1985; Levin et al., 1987). These measures are derived from managers opinions as
to the effectiveness of different mechanisms used to appropriate the returns to inno-
vation for process or product R&D in a line of business. The managers were asked
to rate mechanisms on seven point Likert scales. The mechanisms are: patents pre-
vent duplication; patents secure royalty income, secrecy, lead time, moving down the
learning curve, and complementary sales and service efforts. We measure PATENT
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STRENGTH as the average score for both patent measures for product and process
innovations. As with PATENT SCOPE, PATENT STRENGTH should be negatively
related to the hazard of termination and positively related to the hazard of termi-
nation. Using the Yale survey measures, we also examine the effects of SECRECY,
LEAD TIME and moving down the LEARNING curve as the average score on each
dimension for product and process innovations. We match the Yale survey line-of-
business scores to patents by using the Yale survey concordance with SIC codes and
the US Patent and Trademark Office’s SIC-to-patent concordance.
We include several additional control variables in the hazard predictions. These
variables are all designed to control for the commercial aspects of development. First,
we include a dummy variable that takes the value one if the licensee is a START-
UP, which we define as a company not in existence prior to the licensing of the
patent. STARTUP should influence the termination, which could occur if the com-
pany, rather than the technology failed. There is much additional risk associated
with commercializing through a startup that is associated with setting up the new
firm’s infrastructure, and startups may also be liquidity-constrained relative to es-
tablished firms. These factors suggest that new firms should discount the future
heavily. Proposition 2 implies that these factors should increase the likelihood of
termination. Recall from section 2 that this implies that the hazard of first sale
should be decreasing in these factors.
Second, we control for the RADICALNESS of the invention. Following Shane
(2001) and Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001), we measure the RADICALNESS as a
count of three-digit classes in which previous patents cited on the focal patent are
found, but that the patent itself is not in. Following our discussion of proposition 1,
we have no prior expectation of the relationship between RADICALNESS and the
hazard of termination and commercialization. Radical technologies are more difficult
to develop, but generate more profit if they are successfully developed.
Third, we include a dummy variable that takes the value one if the research that
led to the invention was industry funded. Industry funded research is more likely to
be directed, in the sense that firms are likely to expect tangible beneficial results from
the research or the relationship with the investigator. Indeed, Goldfarb (2002) and
Mansfield (1995) both find evidence consistent with the idea that the congruence of
research goals is an important consideration in the research grant matching process.
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We expect that INDUSTRY FUNDING should decrease the hazard of termination,
and increase the hazard of first sale. Firms should be less likely to terminate efforts to
commercialize inventions funded by themselves or competitor firms, as the results are
likely to be more closely related to their strategic goals. Likewise, we should expect
that industry funded research is more likely to result in a commercial product, as
results stemming from such research would be more commercially relevant.






where sij is the percentage of citations received by patent i that belong to patent
class j out of ni patent classes. A high score suggests that a patent has been a
component of inventions in many different patent classes, and hence more general.
If more general technologies take longer to apply to particular applications, then
we should expect the termination and commercialization decisions to be made more
slowly for general inventions than for less general ones.
Finally we include TECHNOLOGY CLASS dummies. Following the Hall, Jaffe,
and Trajtenberg classification of patents, we break the patents into five categories:
drugs, electronics (including computers and communications), chemicals, mechanical,
and other. We might expect drugs to take longer to reach first sale due to FDA
regulations than, say, mechanical devices.16
5 Empirical Results
Our theory models the empirical reality in which attempts to commercialize patented
inventions are either successful, in which case we observe a first sale, are terminated
by either one of the parties of the license or by default if the patent expires, or are
retained with neither event occurring. The appropriate empirical model for this is a
competing risks model which must adjust for right censoring and the discrete nature
16Reduced form hazard ratios suggest that event patterns in the various categories are distinct.
For example, licenses of drug patents tend to survive longer than other types of inventions. Unfor-
tunately, the data do not allow us to econometrically distinguish these differences.
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of the data. For detailed descriptions of competing risks models see Kalbfleisch and
Prentice (1980) and Lancaster (1990). Let Tf be the duration of a patent that is
licensed until first sale and Td be the duration of a license until it is terminated.
Define T = min (Tf , Td) and let df be an indicator which equals 1 if a patent is com-
mercialized (first sale) from a license and 0 otherwise. Let dd be an indicator which
equals 1 if a patent is terminated from a license and 0 otherwise. Only (T, df , dd) are
observed. Because df and dd are observed exclusion restrictions are not necessary to
uncover the latent survival functions, S (kf , kd|x), if there is sufficient variation in
the vector of regressors x (McCall 1993, Han and Hausman, 1990). Since our data
are discrete, we employ a grouped data approach (Han and Hausman, 1990). Our
model follows McCall (1996).
The probability of a patent being terminated from a license conditional on no
events occurring through period k − 1 is:
Pr(Td = k|X,T > k − 1) = 1− exp(−θd exp(αdk + β′dx)), (8)
where x is a set of exogenous (possibly) time-varying regressors. Similarly,
Pr(Tf = k|X,T > k − 1) = 1− exp(−θf exp(αfk + β′fx)), (9)
is the probability a first sale associated with a patent occurs conditional on no events
occurring through period k − 1. (Period subscripts on x are dropped for readabil-
ity.) Because the theory does not provide us with guidance as to possible exclusion
restrictions, we assume that regressors x are identical in both equations.
The joint survivor function conditional on x is:























where λw(t) is the underlying baseline hazard function and w ∈ {f, d}. αdk and αfk
are the respective baseline hazards and are assumed to follow a 2nd order polyno-
mial. A 2nd-order polynomial is sufficiently flexible to approximate a baseline hazard
function of only five periods. Thus
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αwk = α0k + α1kk + α2kk
2. (11)
The vectors of parameters βw represent the effects of the exogenous variables.
Note that all covariates are constant except patent age, year and interaction terms
of the controls with age. Define
Pf (k) = S(k − 1, k − 1|Θ)− S(k, k − 1|Θ)− 0.5[S(k − 1, k − 1|Θ) + S(k, k|Θ)
− S(k − 1, k|Θ)− S(k, k − 1)|Θ],
Pd(k) = S(k − 1, k − 1|Θ)− S(k − 1, k|Θ)− 0.5[S(k − 1, k − 1|Θ) + S(k, k|Θ)
− S(k − 1, k|Θ)− S(k, k − 1)|Θ],
Pc(k) = S(k − 1, k − 1|Θ),
where Pf (k) is the unconditional probability of first sale by the beginning of period
k, Pd(k) is the unconditional probability of a patent being terminated from a license
by the beginning of period k, and Pc(k) is the unconditional probability of neither
event occurring through the beginning of period k. An adjustment, 0.5[S(k − 1, k −
1|Θ) + S(k, k|Θ) − S(k − 1, k|Θ) − S(k, k − 1|Θ)] is made because durations are
measured in discrete time.
A key problem identified in the labor literature with competing risks models is
that when the risks are not allowed to correlate, a potential bias may arise. Un-
observed determinants of one event (first sale) may be correlated with unobserved
determinants of the complementary event (termination) and duration (decision to
do neither). We might expect unobserved components such as quality of the patent
and uncertainty associated with success of the technology to affect both decisions.
In our specification, the risks correlate by allowing a two mass-point distribution of
location parameter pairs θdj, θfj where j=1,2. Each pair occurs with probability qj.


















dk + (1− dnfk)(1− dndk) log ℘nck. (13)
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for each of the Kn periods of each of the N attempts.
To identify the model, the baseline hazards αf0 and αd0 are fixed to zero. As
there is no constant in the regression, we use deviations from the means in x.
We report the robustness of our results with respect to the different methodolo-
gies in table 5. The proportional hazards models reported in regressions a1 and a2
foreshadow the results of the more sophisticated competing risks models. In a1, an
event is termination of a license, while in a2 an event is the first sale of a license.
That is, the first model does not distinguish between right censoring and first sale,
whereas the second model does not distinguish between right censoring and termi-
nation. Nevertheless, we find a u-shaped relationship between the patent age and
the hazard of termination and more weakly find an inverse u-shaped relationship
between patent age and first sale.17
In regression 5b we report the results of competing risks models with independent
risks.18 The coefficients on AGE and AGE2 clearly depict a u-shape relationship
between patent age and the hazard of termination that reaches its low point when
patents are eight years from issuance. This relationship is robust to controlling
for whether or not the firm was a START-UP, whether the research leading to the
patent was funded by industry, the PATENT SCOPE, PRIOR ART CITED, the
RADICALNESS and GENERALITY of the patent, potential macroeconomic effects
(period dummies), the TECHNOLOGY CLASS dummies and the appropriability
mechanisms that are effective in the line of business.
However, our results concerning the influence of PATENT AGE on the hazard
of first sale do not show a curvilinear relationship between PATENT AGE and the
hazard of first sale. In an unreported regression, we find that if we drop the quadratic
term, the coefficient on patent age is positive and significant when risks are restricted
to be independent.
In regression 5c we allow for correlated risks. We strongly reject the hypothesis
that there is no unobserved heterogeneity (LR statistic = 63.24).19 We continue to
17Note that whereas in the competing risks regressions we report estimated coefficients, in these
two regressions we report the proportional change in hazard with a unit change in the independent
variable.
18To map this regression onto the likelihood function, note that only one mass-point is allowed,
i.e, one {θd, θf} pair. That is, we restrict α12, α22, θ21, θ22 and q2 to 0.
19It is interesting to note that the unobserved components seem to be positively correlated. We
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robustly find that the hazard of termination has a u-shape in patent age, although our
standard errors are larger than in the restricted regressions. Similarly to regression
5b, we find evidence that the hazard of first sale has an inverted u-shape in patent
age or is relatively flat, although here the signal is slightly stronger, as the z-statistic
on the quadratic term moves from -1 to -1.4.
In table 6 we explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of various
controls. Regardless of the controls we add, we find a u-shaped relationship between
PATENT AGE and the hazard of termination. We see little difference of the effect
of PATENT AGE on the hazard of first sale when we add additional controls in
regressions 6a and 6b as compared to regression 5c.
One possible explanation for the null results for commercialization and the signif-
icant results for termination is that they are artifacts of different commercialization
horizons for different technologies. Therefore in regression 6c, we interact the TECH-
NOLOGY CLASS dummies with PATENT AGE. We find no statistically significant
differences by technology in the effects of age on either commercialization or termi-
nation. Moreover the u-shaped relationship of PATENT AGE and termination is
robust to the inclusion of these interaction terms. For commercialization, the inclu-
sion of these interaction terms allows us to measure the effect of the inverse u-shaped
relationship between PATENT AGE and commercialization with more precision. In
regression 7c the linear term is significant and positive while the quadratic term is
marginally significant and negative at the 90% level.
However, in the commercialization regression, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that each coefficient is zero when we add time-period controls in regression 6d. In par-
ticular, when we take into account whether the decision occurred between 1980-1984,
1985-1989 and 1990-1996, the z-statistics drop to about 1.4. Indeed, a likelihood ra-
tio test fails to reject the hypothesis that the PATENT AGE and PATENT AGE2
coefficients are jointly zero in this regression. The results for termination remain
robust to the inclusion of period effects.
find this result weakly in all models we estimated with unobserved heterogeneity. Interpretation of
this result depends on what we believe is unobserved. For example, if we are picking up unobserved
quality, then we would think of θ11 and θ12 as picking up high-quality patents, and θ21 and θ22 as
picking up low quality patents. In this case the model is predicting much lower hazards of events
with high quality patents than low quality patents, and that 46% of the patents are high quality.
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Table 7 provides a robustness check for the quadratic form of the relationship
between age and termination, and age and first sale. When we remove the quadratic
term from the first sale equation we do not find a monotonically increasing function,
rather we find a zero coefficient on the linear patent age term (regression 7b). Nor
do we find any evidence of a cubic relationship (regression 7a). Our data suggest
that if there is a relationship between PATENT AGE and the hazard of first sale, a
quadratic form fits the data best. However, the signal is weak and our data are too
noisy to measure it convincingly.
In contrast, the hypothesis that the PATENT AGE and PATENT AGE2 coeffi-
cients are jointly zero in the termination equation is rejected at the 95% level. In
regression 7d we see that the relationship is clearly not linear. Interestingly, the cubic
form seems to fit reasonably well in regression 7c. The shape of this cubic function
predicts a modestly increasing function until a patent is three years of age followed
by an inverted-u that reaches a minimum when at 11 years and increases through
the age of 17. However, the null hypothesis that the cubic form does not explain the
data any better data any better than the quadratic form cannot be rejected at the
90% level.
In addition, we measured the relationship using 14 age dummies for PATENT
AGE and PATENT AGE2. Applying all time constant controls, the data predict a
u-shape for termination, and we generally measure zero coefficients for the hazard of
first sale.20
In short, we are quite confident that there is a u-shaped relationship between a
patent’s age and the hazard of termination, whereas we find a relatively flat relation-
ship between a patent’s age and the hazard of first sale. We offer two explanations
for this weak result for the first sale hazard. The first is that there is simply less
information about commercialization in the data than termination. In table 1 we
see that 18% (146 of 805) of the patents are commercialized by the fifth period. Sec-
ond, the decision to sell is subject to more factors beyond the control of the decision
makers than the decision to terminate. For example, an intent to commercialize can
be confounded by such exogenous factors as the state of the underlying technology
or market demand. As a result, it is likely more difficult to measure the factors
20This pattern becomes clear after smoothing with three-year moving averages. These regressions
are available from the authors upon request.
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that influence technology commercialization precisely than the factors that influence
license termination.
We base our analysis of the magnitude of the effects on regression 5c. We report
the mean predicted hazards of termination and first sale for all licenses at various
simulated patent ages in period 2. The results for termination appear in figure 2. A
95% confidence interval is also depicted. As we can see, increasing the age by one
year for a patent of mean age (5) increases the hazard probability of termination
by 0.006 (since the mean predicted hazard of 5 year old patent is 0.06; this implies
a 10% decrease in the predicted hazard). The effect begins to reverse itself as a
patent reaches age 9. In Figure 3 we present the similar graph for the hazard of first
sale. Here the hazard of first sale increases by 7% when patent age increases from
age 5 to 6. The figures also depict 95% confidence intervals for these estimates. As
expected, the intervals are at their narrowest points at the mean age of 5. Reflecting
our general results, they are much narrower in figure 2 (termination).
Recall that propositions 1 and 4 give unambiguous implications for PATENT
STRENGTH and PATENT SCOPE on the hazards of termination and first sale, re-
spectively. Across all our regressions, we find a robust positive effect for the PATENT
STRENGTH in a line of business on the likelihood of first sale and a robust negative
effect on the likelihood of termination. Because these measures are derived from a
Likert scale, we look at effect of a change in one standard deviation from the mean.
If managers in a line of business rated the effectiveness of patents one standard devi-
ation higher than the mean for all other lines of business, the hazard of termination
decreased by 0.003 which is a 5% hazard change (this difference is significant at the
99% level). An increase in one standard deviation from the mean increases the haz-
ard of first sale by 0.004 which is a 7% hazard change (this difference is significant at
the 99% level). We also find a robust effect of PATENT SCOPE on first sale across
all regressions, although we do not find such an effect on termination. With regards
to patent scope, if each sample patent had spanned one additional category, then the
mean increase of hazard of first sale would be 0.029 or 59% (difference significant at
the 95% level). As anticipated by our discussion of comparative statics in Section
3, we find non-robust results for the effects of PRIOR ART CITED. Although not
always measured precisely, patents that cite more prior art are more likely to be
terminated.
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Though speculative, we also find other interesting empirical results. As we would
expect, licenses of innovations stemming from INDUSTRY-FUNDED research are
less likely to be terminated. On average, the predicted decrease in hazard of termi-
nation of a license of a patent stemming from research funded by industry is 0.04
(difference significant at the 95% level). This reflects a 57% decrease in the pre-
dicted hazard. There is no consistently measurable effect on the hazard of first sale.
This suggests that INDUSTRY-FUNDED inventions are valuable, but take longer
to commercialize. We note that this result is consistent with firm’s shelving industry
funded inventions.
Our results concerning the licensing to a STARTUP and both commercialization
and termination are intriguing. In table 6 we find that the hazard of termination
and first sale decrease if the technology is licensed to a STARTUP. This result is
sensitive to allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, whereas the first sale result is
sensitive to the inclusion of time dummies. This result does not match the prediction
of proposition 2 and is left for further study.
In some regressions we find that technologies that have broader applications are
also more difficult to commercialize. However, the significance of this result is highly
dependent on the specification. One might speculate that the nature of general
technologies is such that they are farther from a commercial application. That is,
less specialized technologies are less likely to be immediately useful.
Finally, technologies that are more radical are more likely to be commercialized.
Again, this result is sensitive to specification, although it does not disappear with the
inclusion of various controls (see regression 6d). Each additional three-digit class that
previous patents cited on the focal patent increases the hazard of first sale by 0.004,
which is 8%. This difference is significant at the 95% level. This result suggests
that the increase profit potential of radical technologies overwhelms the increased
risk associated with such technologies.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that keys to understanding much of the Bayh-Dole policy
debate are none other than the problems of appropriability and uncertainty identified
by Arrow (1962) nearly a half a century ago. To do so, we examine a model of exclu-
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sive licensing in which a single firm has licensed a university invention that requires
further development in order to be successful commercially. Success is uncertain
for both technical and market reasons. In each period, the firm decides whether
to invest in further development, thereby increasing the probability of (technical)
success, or to terminate the project. If the firm is successful at commercialization, it
earns monopoly profit until the patent expires. We then characterize the hazard of
termination and first sale as a function of the patent age, expected profit, and the
probability of technical success. Parameters such as patent scope and strength which
increase expected cumulative profits decrease the hazard of termination regardless of
patent age. The relation between patent age and termination is, however, more com-
plex. The fact that an older patent provides exclusive legal rights for fewer periods
provides an incentive for the firm to terminate sooner than if it held a more recent
patent. However, the probability the invention will succeed technically is higher the
longer the firm has invested, so that the effect of patent age (a + t) on the hazard of
termination may be non-monotonic.
Our empirical results provide strong support for the view that the ability to
appropriate returns is important for inventions whose success is highly uncertain. We
find that increased appropriability, as measured by Lerner’s index of patent scope
and effectiveness of patents in a line of business, decrease the hazard of termination
and increase the hazard of first sale. We find a u-shaped hazard of termination
which is consistent with the opposing effects of time on the probability of success
and appropriability as measured by the length of time left on the patent in the model.
Our results on the hazard of first sale are less robust. The theory suggests that, if the
firm sells as soon as the invention is successful technically, the hazards of termination
and first sale will be inversely related. However, our empirical results show a flatter
hazard of first sale.
Several caveats may explain the latter result. First, note that our characterization
of the hazard of first sale and termination is based on the assumption that the firm
introduces the invention to the market as soon as it is successful. If delaying first
sale is profitable, the hazard for first sale and termination need not be inversely
related, and in fact, we cannot characterize the relation. A variety of factors related
to strategic or other aspects of the market could clearly make delaying first sale
optimal. Second, both the theoretical and empirical analysis presume that firms
24
licensing these inventions intend to commercialize them. While we believe this is
a fair assumption given the march-in rights contained in the Bayh-Dole Act, it is
possible that university attempts to prevent firms from shelving are not perfect. If
milestones or annual fees are sufficiently low, it may be a profitable strategy for
firms to maintain the license, preventing competitors from having access (as would
be the case if the invention were returned to MIT). While we cannot eliminate this
possibility nor identify when it might be happening, we suspect that our first caveat
is more likely given the importance that technology transfer offices attach to due
diligence in order to prevent shelving.21
Finally, note also that we have presumed that termination results when the firm
decides not to continue developing a commercial product. However, if the property
rights are weak, as we might expect in say, electronics or mechanical engineering in-
ventions, a firm may maintain a license until critical, but non-protectable knowledge
is transferred, and then drop the license and invent around the invention.22 Hence,
a result of a terminated patent (license) is not necessarily indicative of lack of tech-
nology transfer, or of a technology failure in general, except in the sense that the
university, and perhaps inventor if a complementary consulting arrangement does
not exist, will not receive rents (Henrekson and Goldfarb, 2002).23
These caveats aside, our results contribute to the growing literature on innova-
tion based on university research. While much research has focused on spillovers
through publications, consulting, and conference participation (see, for example,
Adams, 1990; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Cohen et al., 1998; Jaffe, 1989; Mans-
21Recall that Thursby et al (2001) found this in their survey of 62 universities. In the particular
case of MIT, several companies lost their licenses when they did not make annual payments or
failed to meet a milestone. This is, of course, much more common with start-ups and small firms.
In many cases, writing a business plan was a milestone and when the plan was not delivered, the
firm would lose its license.
22Katharine Ku, head of the Stanford Office of Technology Licensing has indicated to the authors
that not only does this happen, but it is considered fair-play and not at all unethical.
23Under the invent-around scenario the university may still receive rents if the license involved
the transfer of equity to MIT. In this case returns are tied to profitability of the firm, rather than
profitability of the specific licensed patent. Since equity is permanent, MIT could earn returns even
if a particular invention were terminated. This may explain differential use of equity in licensing
agreements across types of technology.
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field, 1995; and Zucker et al., 1998), relatively little empirical research has explored
the licensing mechanism, and in particular the question of whether private firms
would adopt and commercialize university inventions in the absence of strong prop-
erty rights to technology. Our results support the key principle underlying the Bayh-
Dole Act. The ability to appropriate the returns to investment in innovation enhances
the commercialization of technology licensed by universities to private firms.
Our results also contribute to the broader literature on the relationship between
patents and innovation. Gallini’s (2002) review indicates that the link between patent
length and innovation is ambiguous, in general, but may have an inverted u-shape
because of the incentives associated with entry. We contribute to this literature by
showing that, even without sequential innovation, the combined effects of uncertainty
and appropriability lead to an inverted u-shaped relationship between patent age and
the hazard of first sale and a u-shaped relationship between patent age and the hazard
of license termination.
Lastly, we contribute to the empirical literature on the effectiveness of patents
in appropriating returns from R&D. In contrast to prior studies based on surveys
of the perceptions of R&D personnel, we provide direct empirical evidence of the
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7.1 Delaying first sale
To simplify notation, we let m = 0, in which case the license includes no financial
incentives to prevent the firm from delaying first sale. If the firm is able to maintain
its license without selling even after development has been successful, it compares
the value of profits it can achieve by commercializing this period to the value it
could achieve by delaying optimally. Since µa+t+s < µa+t+1, given the information
available to the firm at period t, it does not anticipate delaying for more than one
period. Therefore the value function writes:
Vc(t, Πa+t; a) = max{pt max{Πa+t, δµa+t+1}+ (1− pt)δEVc(t + 1, Π̃a+t+1; a)− c, 0}.
(14)
Since µa+t > δµa+t+1, it is clear that EVc(t, Πa+t; a) is unchanged as compared to
the case where delaying is not possible.
Suppose Πa+t < δµa+t+1 so that the firm chooses to delay first sale, then (14)
becomes:
Vc(t, Πa+t; a) = max{ptδµa+t+1 + (1− pt)δEVc(t + 1, Π̃a+t+1; a)− c, 0}. (15)
The ability to delay bounds the value of Vc below, and possibly, away from 0. If
Vc(t, Πa+t; a) > 0, then the firm continues. If not, the firm stops. Therefore, in
any period t for which Vc(t, Πa+t; a) given by (15) is greater than zero, the firm
will continue with probability 1. The reservation value that governs the optimal
termination decision is below the reservation value that governs the optimal first
sale decision. If Vc(t, Πa+t; a) given by (15) is less than zero, then the firm will never
delay, and the value function is effectively given by (1). The reservation value that
governs the optimal termination decision is higher than the reservation value that
governs the optimal first sale decision.
If the firm succeeded at t, its dynamic programming problem reduces to choosing
the optimal date of first sale according to the following value function:
Vs(t, Πa+t; a) = max{Πa+t, δµa+t+1}.
The terminal condition is given by Vs(L + 1) ≡ 0.
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Suppose that there exists a set D of consecutive periods in which (15) is greater
than zero. Then the probability that the firm will sell in some period t ∈ D is:
qs(t; a) = [1− Fa+t(δµa+t+1)][pt
t−1∏
s=0










The first bracketed term is the probability that the firm will not delay in period t.
The first part of the second bracketed term the probability that the firm is successful
in period t, and the second part is the probability that the firm was successful in a
period of D different from t, but chose to delay. Thus, although we can compute the
probability of first sale in a given period t, given that the firm could have optimally
delayed sales in previous consecutive periods, characterizing the hazard of first sale
is intractible.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Given a, let t̂(a) < L− a be that period of time for which:
pt̂(a)µa+t̂(a) − c ≥ 0 and ptµa+t − c < 0,∀t > t̂(a).
Then, EVc(t̂(a) + 1; a) = 0. Using (1) and working backward from L− a, we obtain
for t < t̂(a), and some realization of Π̃a+t:






(1− pt+i)(pt+n+1µa+t+n+1 − c), 0}. (17)
Differentiating B(t; a) given by (2) with respect to δ yields ∂B(t;a)
∂δ
≤ 0. This implies
that for a given patent age a + t, the probability of termination decreases with δ,
which in turn implies that if δ′ > δ, the hazard of termination at a + t is lower at δ′
than at δ.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We wish to find conditions under which the hazard of termination decreases with
patent age. A necessary condition for the hazard of termination to decrease with
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patent age is for a given a, B(t + 1; a) < B(t; a). A sufficient condition is that
the distribution function does not change rapidly between a + t and a + t + 1. Since
Π̃ ∈ [0, Π], if c ≤ δ(1−p)EVc, then X ≤ 0, and thus pf = 0. Therefore, in the analysis
below, we assume that δ(1−pt)EVc(t+1; a)− c < 0. Using (2), B(t+1; a) < B(t; a)
if and only if:
pt+1
pt
≥ c− δ(1− pt+1)EVc(t + 2; a)
c− δ(1− pt)EVc(t + 1; a) . (18)
The left-hand side is strictly greater than 1, so the condition will definitely be satisfied
if the right-hand side is less than or equal to 1. This is the case if and only if:




EVc(t + 2; a)− EVc(t + 1; a) (19)
Given EVc(t+2; a)−EVc(t+1; a) > 0, then if (19) is satisfied, it must be the case that
pt+1
pt
and pt are small enough. pt cannot be too small (for example, pt must be bounded
away from 0). We need to find conditions under which EVc(t+2; a)−EVc(t+1; a) > 0.
Suppose EVc(t + 2; a) > 0 and EVc(t + 1; a) ≥ 0. Using (1), we have:
EVc(t+2; a)−EVc(t+1; a) = [1− δ(1− pt+1)]EVc(t+2; a)− (pt+1µa+t+1− c), (20)
If pt+1µa+t1 ≤ c, then (18) is definitely satisfied even if EVc(t+2; a) > 0 is weakened
to Vc(t + 2; a) ≥ 0 because from pt+1µa+t1 ≤ c, it follows that EVc(t + 2; a) = 0 ⇒
EVc(t + 1; a) = 0.
Since we clearly have:
µt+1 > δEVc(t + 2; a),
the right-hand side of (20) decreases with pt+1, so that (20) will be satisfied if pt+1 is
small enough and EVc(t+2; a) is large. This implies that a must be small. Therefore,
if a is close to zero, for any two consecutive, periods t and t + 1, such that pt+1
pt
is
greater than, but close to 1, and pt is small, the hazard of termination decreases with
t. Otherwise, the hazard of termination increases with t.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 5
For a given t, the hazard of first sale clearly decreases with a since the hazard of
termination increases with a. For a given a, a change in the hazard of first sale
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between t and t + 1 is given by:
∆s = (1− pf (a + t + 1))pt+1 − (1− pf (a + t))pt.
If pf (a + t + 1) ≤ pf (a + t), then ∆s is clearly positive. ∆s is negative only if
pf (a + t + 1) is sufficiently larger than pf (a + t). Therefore the relationship between
pf and ∆s is generally ambiguous when pf increases with t.
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Period Abandon First Sale Right Censored Surviving Total
1 74 49 78 604 805
2 32 26 49 497 604
3 54 40 98 305 497
4 49 20 35 201 305
5 34 11 34 122 201
6 8 2 9 103 122
7 10 6 11 76 103
8 6 2 9 59 76
9 0 11 9 39 59
10 1 0 14 24 39
11 1 1 7 15 24
12 2 13 15
13 7 6 13
14 2 4 6
15 2 2 4
16 2 0 2
Totals 269 168 368 0 2875
Table 1: Unconditional survival rates
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Age Number Percent Cumulative Percentage
0 91 11.30 11.30
1 113 14.04 25.34
2 113 14.04 39.38
3 106 13.17 52.55
4 71 8.82 61.37
5 69 8.57 69.94
6 46 5.71 75.65
7 67 8.32 83.98
8 38 4.72 88.70
9 34 4.22 92.92
10 14 1.74 94.66
11 11 1.37 96.02
12 10 1.24 97.27
13 6 0.75 98.01
14 9 1.12 99.13
15 5 0.62 99.75
16 2 0.25 100.00
Total 805 100.00

































































































































































































































































































Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
PATENT AGE 5.140 3.399 1 17
PATENT AGE2 37.965 48.426 1 289
PATENT AGE3 351.739 676.725 1 4913
Nature of Technology 
START-UP 0.327 0 1
PATENT SCOPE 1.339 0.639 1 6
PRIOR ART CITED 9.968 11.926 0 70
RADICALNESS 5.814 5.405 0 57
INDUSTRY FUNDED 0.168 0 1
GENERALITY 0.302 0.315 0 0.9
Technology classes
DRUG PATENT 0.216 0 1
CHEMICAL PATENT 0.311 0 1
ELECTRIC PATENT 0.265 0 1
MECHANICAL PATENT 0.032 0 1
Appropriability Measures
LEAD TIME 5.369 0.506 4 6.13
SECRECY 3.923 0.406 3 4.88
LEARNING 5.003 0.435 4 5.75
PATENT STRENGTH 4.108 0.747 1.75 5.32
Period Dummies
YEAR 1980-1984 0.257 0 1
YEAR 1985-1989 0.314 0 1
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
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